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I. Introduction
I'm the decider, and I decide what is best. President George W. Bush, April 18, 2006. Politicians are generally happy to exercise their power to decide things. Monetary policy is perhaps the most glaring exception. Delegation to an independent central bank is now the norm.
However, the type of delegation di¤ers widely across countries. One broad institutional model is goal independence, under which the principal (the government) delegates to the agent (the central bank) full policymaking powers, including the power to decide the appropriate policy target. The U.S. Federal Reserve, which has a broad mandate to target stable prices and full employment, is considered by most commentators to enjoy goal independence. It has the authority to prioritize between its employment and price stability goals and to interpret the latter (and operationalize via targets for monetary aggregates, in ‡ation, etc.) as it sees …t. By contrast, the Bank of England (post-1997) has instrument independence. Its authority to act autonomously is well established within fairly narrowly de…ned limits: it enjoys freedom of action over its policy instruments in pursuit of a policy target decided by the government.
Of the two models, instrument independence seems to conform with other common institutional arrangements in democratic societies. Other government-sponsored bodies (such as the police, statistical agencies, electoral commissions) usually operate on this basis. The much broader mandate implied by goal independence, on the other hand, is rather anomalous. Perhaps only the judiciary enjoys the same degree of autonomy, but even here the delegated authorities (judges) are generally limited to enforcing and interpreting either laws passed by the executive or legislative branch of government or a written constitution, rather than legislating on their own account (Goodhart and Meade, 2004) .
One could argue that the independence enjoyed by goal-independent central banks (GICBs) is particularly striking given the political sensitivity of their core role -the conduct of monetary policy. However, this political sensitivity could explain the decision to delegate. Because monetary policy is contentious, it can split otherwise homogeneous political coalitions. Taking monetary policy "o¤ the table"makes it easier for these political actors to e¤ectively combine to control policy with respect to other key issues. Far from being constrained, politicians who decide to delegate may see their overall freedom of action enhanced.
To analyze this question, I present a model of an economy whose agents hold heterogeneous views over monetary policy and other policy areas. Speci…cally, preferences are assumed to di¤er over monetary policy and a second dimension, where both are dichotomous. Policymaking is modeled via a political economy game which has three stages. In the …rst stage of the game, "factions"(groups of agents with similar preferences) can form coalitions with each other. In the second stage, coalitions determine their policy platforms. In the …nal stage, the largest coalition is given the opportunity to set policy.
The game has a zero-sum element, so that the bene…t of forming a broad coalition is obvious: the largest coalition is the one that sets policy. The cost of coalition formation lies in the second stage of the game: individual factions within coalitions must engage in (potentially costly) political lobbying in an e¤ort to in ‡uence the coalition's platform. 2 This cost arises from the heterogeneity of potential governing coalitions, which in turn re ‡ects the multiplicity of the policy space.
The motive for delegating the monetary policy decision to a fully (goal-) independent central bank is that it removes the intracoalition con ‡ict over monetary policy from the political arena.
3 I derive the conditions under which delegation will occur. In equilibrium, the cost of coalition formation depends upon the relative sizes of the factions within each coalition. Since e¤ective lobbying strength depends on faction size (because larger factions have lower per-member lobbying costs), equal-sized factions (with equal chances of winning) will invest heavily in lobbying for their preferred outcome. The contest will therefore be costly for the coalition as a whole, motivating both sides to take monetary policy "o¤ the table."By contrast, if one faction dominates in terms of size, then lobbying strengths are clearly mismatched, the likely victor in the policy dispute is clear, and no faction will commit signi…cant resources in the dispute. Incentives to delegate will be minimal.
How can we test this prediction? Since (as I demonstrate) coalitions form in equilibrium based on unanimity along one policy dimension and disagreement over the other dimension, then the relative size of the factions within each coalition is determined by the correlation between agents'positions with respect to the two policy dimensions. When this correlation increases, coalition preferences become more homogeneous (one faction dominates) and the costs of political campaigning relative to its bene…ts are lower. Correlated preferences make it easier to partition society politically and lessen the need for institutional remedies. Other things being equal, GICBs are less likely to be established in societies where preferences over the two policy dimensions are more closely correlated. This is the prediction I take to the data.
The model has a further implication: if goal independence is selected endogenously as in the model, then its estimated e¤ect on in ‡ation will be biased upwards, towards zero if the causal e¤ect is actually negative (as seems likely). This is because goal independence will be endogenously selected when the central banker is likely to be neither too "hard"nor too "soft"on in ‡ation, and since central bankers are conservative on average, it is largely the former ("in ‡ation nutters") who are ruled out. This could then explain why the estimated negative e¤ect of CBI on in ‡ation, at least according to the standard de jure measures, has not been identi…ed outside a narrow subset of advanced economies (Eij¢ nger and De Haan, 1996) . Section III includes a further discussion of these issues, while section IV presents evidence of this bias in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the e¤ect of CBI on in ‡ation and of a strong negative e¤ect of CBI on in ‡ation once endogenous selection is modeled explicitly. This paper draws on and contributes to several strands of literature: a mainstream macroeconomics literature on CBI; a political science critique of this approach; a newer political economy literature that combines elements of both; a parallel political science literature that takes a historical, case-study approach; and game theoretic literatures on both lobbying and coalition formation. Of these literatures the …rst is perhaps the largest and best known (see the surveys in Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Drazen, 2000; and Eij¢ nger and De Haan, 1996 , for useful summaries). For our purposes its key contribution (Fischer, 1995) has been to clarify the distinction between goal independence-the full delegation embodied in Rogo¤'s (1985) "conservative"central banker model-and instrument independence-the kind of relationship suggested by agency models (Walsh, 1995) . This paper makes the distinction more concrete by illustrating how the di¤erent institutional forms mold political incentives.
These economists'accounts of central bank behavior have come under criticism from a political science approach to institutional behavior, which has tended to focus on the actions and incentives of heterogeneous, con ‡icting groups in society (Wooley, 1984; Bowles and White, 1994) . This paper takes heterogeneity seriously: indeed, it provides an account of CBI based on how preference heterogeneity shapes political incentives.
In this respect it follows other recent contributions to the political economy literature that have started to address agent heterogeneity, con ‡ict over policy, and the role of the central bank within such an environment. The role of delegation in these accounts typically lies in its ability to alter the strategic interaction between political actors in the determination of monetary policy. For instance, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) show that an independent central bank can partially solve the time inconsistency problem even if policymakers can decide to overrule its decisions, but only if there are "multiple veto players,"that is, checks and balances. Moser (1999) uses similar logic to predict that delegation is more likely under political systems with checks and balances.
The motivation for delegation in these papers is the standard time-inconsistency problem. 4 However, the almost exclusive focus on time inconsistency has been criticized (Blinder, 1997; and Posen, 1993) . This paper focuses on the coalition-formation process as an alternative rationale for delegation, presenting in a game theoretic framework ideas that have been explored more discursively in the political science literature. For instance, Bernhard (1998) argues that delegation helps to reduce informational asymmetries between di¤erent members of the governing political coalition, reducing the potential for costly political disputes.
5 Bernhard and Leblang (2002) Bernhard and Leblang (2002) show that CBI tends to improve the durability of cabinet governments and also discuss some case studies that provide further support for their argument; in section V, I present a synthesis of their arguments along with some further historical evidence that supports the coalition-formation account of delegation. The historical record provides a rich vein for analyzing these issues, which other authors have drawn on to motivate their accounts of CBI. For instance, Goodman (1991) argues that CBI is more likely in countries where there exists a powerful coalition in favour of price stability (such as a powerful banking sector), and when this coalition does not expect to be in power for long and therefore wants to bind the hands of its successor.
7 He draws on the postwar experience of several European countries, notably (West) Germany, to support this contention.
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This paper also contributes to the game theoretic literature on coalition formation, and its exploration of the costs and bene…ts of coalition formation echoes themes explored elsewhere.
9 For instance, Levy (2004) argues that coalitions (or political parties) allow groups of politicians in multidimensional policy environments to commit to a policy platform drawn from a wider subset of policies than their individual preferred policies. Similarly, in the model presented in this paper, heterogeneous coalitions can commit to o¤er (in probabilistic terms) an outcome di¤erent from the ideal policy of any of their constituent factions, since in a multidimensional policy setting political actors are willing to compromise on one dimension to secure their preferred policy on another. However, there is a tension between coalition size and preference heterogeneity which can be di¤used by delegation. These opposing centripetal and centrifugal forces have been discussed elsewhere in the coalition formation literature (Demange, 1994) . To model these forces 5 Interestingly, Bernhard (1998) …nds that the heterogeneity of class support for left-wing parties (captured in the "Alford Index") is positively related to CBI. His argument is that heterogeneity within (potential) governing coalitions increases the probability that informational asymmetries could trigger costly political disputes, thereby increasing the role of delegation. 6 Bernhard and Leblang (2002) , p. 807. Italics added for emphasis. 7 Although when the policymaker is motivated by electoral success rather than ideological or policy preferences, it might be advantageous to not bind the hands of any successor. For instance, a "conservative" candidate might prefer not to delegate policy to a conservative central banker, so that the electorate's fear of higher in ‡ation under the opposing candidate would motivate them to vote for the conservative (see Milesi-Ferretti, 1994 , where a similar argument is pursued with respect to wage indexation). 8 Lohmann (1998) makes similar points, arguing that Germany's federal constitution and the strong role of the Lander in the governance of the Bundesbank helped to cement the institution's independence over time. 9 See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section IV) for a discussion of the application of cooperative game theory to the issue of coalition formation. Bloch (1997) analyses the application of noncooperative game theory to the issue. Bloch argues that noncooperative game theory is more useful for analysing games where agents' payo¤s depend on the entire partition of society (as in this paper) and not merely the coalition(s) of which they are members. Levy (2002) contains an application of both cooperative and noncooperative techniques, illustrating the relative merits of the two. more concretely, I develop a rent-seeking model derived from Hillman (1989) that captures the costs of coalition formation. 10 My contribution to this literature is to demonstrate how faction size can endogenously determine e¤ective lobbying strength.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III outlines (a) the model's key prediction with respect to the distribution of preferences over monetary policy and the likely institutional choice, and (b) some implications for the estimated relationship between institutional choice and in ‡ationary outcomes. Section IV presents some empirical tests, while section V discusses some case-study evidence that supports the theory. Section VI concludes.
II. The Model
A. Demographics, Preferences, and the Political Economy Game
The economy consists of a large, even, …nite set of agents N with preferences over policies on two dimensions ; , where each policy choice is dichotomous. Each agent derives the same utility V j ; j 2 ; from the implementation of each of her preferred policy choices and no utility from the implementation of each of the alternative policies. The dimensions are de…ned according to the relative utility (i.e., how "contentious"the policy is): V V . Agents are therefore of four types depending on their ideal policy pair ; . Opinion over each policy dimension is distributed evenly so that a proportion , there is no correlation between policy preferences; = 1 denotes full correlation.
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Agents within each faction act collectively. This allows us to treat the coalition-formation game (see below) as played between four representative players, one drawn from each faction, but weighted according to faction size.
Policymaking is modeled via a political economy game that has three stages: 10 The rationale for using a rent-seeking model rather than a simple Nash bargaining model is that Paretoimproving delegation requires some welfare cost of policy disagreement. The rent-seeking model with dissipated rents provides a simple and intuitive means of introducing such a cost. 11 See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the agents in the economy. 12 The correlation coe¢ cient, ;
1. First, in the coalitional subgame, players i join a coalition.
2. Each coalition chooses a policy platform. If coalition members disagree about either or both policy dimensions, then policy is contested via a rent-seeking subgame, similar to that in Hillman (1989) .
3. An electoral subgame then gives the largest coalition the opportunity to set policy.
The coalitional subgame is described in Appendix I. I …rst describe the second and third stages. Rent-seeking subgame Assume a given coalition structure. Each policy dimension has two choices f0; 1g; hence any policy disputed within a coalition has two factions competing for control. Denote the bene…t of having one's preferred policy implemented (on a particular policy dimension) V . 13 Each faction J 2 fS; Lg within the coalition makes a dissipated bid to control policy, 13 Since we are looking at one policy dimension alone, we can drop the superscript.
with value x J . 14 This cost is shared equally among all members of the faction. The faction that makes the highest bid then sets the coalition's policy platform according to its members'preferences. Since no solution to this problem exists in pure strategies (Drazen, 2000) , I assume that factions adopt mixed strategies denoted by the cdf J (x) (from Hillman, 1989, we know that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists).
The n J agents in each faction n L n S make an equal individual contribution
n J to the bid. Denote the probability of the coalition in question actually controlling policy as 2 [0; 1]. Then the payo¤s for a given x J with respect to the disputed policy for typical members of each faction are given as:
The faction's objective is to maximize the expected average payo¤ of its members.
Electoral subgame
Denoting factions according to their preferences over policies ; , assume that faction f0; 1g will never form a coalition with faction f1; 0g and similarly faction f1; 1g will never form a coalition with faction f0; 0g: the rent-seeking subgame generates payo¤s such that this assumption holds; see equation (4) below. Hence, the choice for faction
forming a coalition with faction
, or on its own (a "0 coalition").
I assume a general electoral decision rule (a function mapping the partition of agents (i.e., the coalition structure) into probabilities of winning for each coalition) in which the probability of winning for each coalition is an increasing function of its size and a decreasing function of the size of other coalitions. More speci…cally, I assume that the function is su¢ ciently elastic that a or coalition (with size 1 2 ) wins against a 0 coalition (with maximum size 2 < 1 2 ) with probability = 1; that in a contest between two equal-sized coalitions each wins with probability = 1 2 ; and in a four-way contest the larger two factions each win with probability = 1 2 and the smaller coalitions have zero probability of winning.
B. Solution
The game can be solved by backwards induction. I …rst solve the intracoalition lobbying game (stage 2) for a given coalition structure (the third stage of the game then follows automatically from the coalition structure as described above). This gives the payo¤ for a given coalition structure which then allows us to solve the …rst stage of the game. 14 S; L denote, respectively, small and large factions (n
The objective of each faction is to maximize the payo¤ of a representative member. In any mixed strategy equilibrium the expected payo¤ must be the same for all bids x J assigned a positive probability. Moreover, no faction's per-member bid will exceed the expected gain from winning V , and the larger faction's maximum per-member bid will be lower because it only has to match the maximum total bid of the smaller faction and can share the cost more widely. Hence:
Hence, we can solve for the bidding strategy summarized by (x) :
The associated pdf for each faction's bid is given by:
The probability of the larger faction's policy being chosen, de…ned as , is then given by:
Note that since the small faction sees all its rents dissipated, factions that disagree on both dimensions of policy have no incentive to form a coalition. Hence, as discussed above, only three coalition options for each faction are possible ( coalition, coalition, or 0 coalition).
Before discussing the solution to the …rst stage of the game, it is worth commenting brie ‡y on the rent-seeking subgame. First, the fact that the smaller faction sees all gains from cooperation dissipated, whereas the larger faction retains some of the gains from controlling policy, simply restates Hillman's result that the faction with less to gain from control sacri…ces all its rents. The new contribution is that the relative gain from control is endogenously related to faction size (the small faction gains less because its per-member lobbying costs are higher). Second, coalition membership entails a dissipated bidding cost
The cost of disagreement falls as the outcome becomes more certain ( increases towards 1). This is the mechanism driving Proposition 1, below.
Appendix I gives the solution to the coalition-formation subgame using the sequential game structure and equilibrium concept (stationary perfect equilibrium) developed by Bloch (1996) . It shows that only the coalition structure ; (two coalitions formed along the policy dimension) is consistent with stationary perfect equilibrium.
The key features of the equilibrium are as follows:
Agents inside each coalition agree unanimously on the most contentious policy dimension .
Disagreement on the other policy dimension is overcome through a process of lobbying as discussed above.
Each coalition wins the last stage and sets policy with probability = Expected utility for the larger and smaller factions in each coalition, denoted superscript fL; Sg respectively, is given by:
To make the analysis more speci…c, the two policy dimensions ; can be interpreted as monetary policy 2 f0; 1g and a second dimension of policy 2 f0; 1g. The second dimension can be thought of as "all other policies"or alternatively as an indicator of agent "type"(e.g. working class/middle class or poor/rich) as a predictor of preferences on other policies. De…ne an economy where = (i.e., the second dimension is most important) as a " coalition economy,"and an economy where = (the monetary policy dimension is most important) as a " coalition economy."Since both factions in each coalition have the same expected payo¤, the payo¤ for all agents in each coalition depends only on the division of coalitions ( coalition vs. coalition):
III. Predictions
A. Delegation of Policy
Agents have the option of delegating the monetary policy decision to a GICB prior to the coalition-formation stage of the game. In the question of delegating policy, all agents are assumed to have the power of veto, with political control over policy the fall-back position.
In order to derive expected utilities with the GICB, we need to specify how policy is determined in this environment. Clearly, the GICB could choose either policy stance, and its preferences (or ability to act on them) might be unclear to the politicians. To capture this uncertainty, I assume that policy is set probabilistically, with policy set at = 1 with probability p and = 0 with probability 1 p, where p, drawn from a continuous distribution over [0; 1] with cdf F (p), is common knowledge.
Note that delegation of policy over by de…nition removes that dimension of policy. Hence, coalitions form along the policy dimension if delegation occurs (coalitions have weight
and each has a probability 1 2 of controlling policy and implementing its favored policy with respect to ). Note also that the equilibrium coalition structure is also changed by the decision to delegate, if (absent delegation) coalitions would form along the dimension .
We are now ready to state the central proposition of this paper:
Proposition 1 As increases, the probability of policy delegation to a GICB falls. This implies that the probability of observing goal independence is negatively related to the correlation between preferences over and .
Proof. Consider …rst the case of a coalition economy. Superscript P denotes payo¤s under political control of , superscript C denotes central bank control. Then payo¤s under each regime are given as:
where b p i 2 f1 p; pg depends on the agent i's preferred policy i = i 2 f0; 1g.
Hence, U C U P i¤:
Since CBI relies upon unanimity, CBI requires that (14) holds for
(its minimum value) the range of values for p for which this condition holds for both 1 p; p is relatively wide: p 2 . However, as increases, the range narrows: at = 1, only p = 1 2 allows CBI to occur.
To show this formally, the substitution b p i = f1 p; pg into the above condition yields:
Then:
And:
Now consider a -coalition economy. Then payo¤s under each regime are given as:
And CBI chosen i¤ p 2 1 2 1 1 2
To restate Proposition 1 in nontechnical language, the model predicts that goal independence is more likely to occur when the correlation between preferences over monetary policy and the second policy dimension is low, this being the environment where coalition formation is harder. This proposition is tested in the empirical section and found to be supported by the available data.
B. In ‡ation and Endogenous Central Bank Independence
The standard argument in favor of GICBs (formalized in Rogo¤, 1985) is that the pool of potential central bankers is dominated by conservative (in ‡ation-averse) types. 15 This would suggest that the distribution of p across countries should place a higher weight on low values, and a lower weight on high values, so that E [p] < 1 2 . 15 Of course Rogo¤'s arguments are more complex than this, since the role of the conservative central banker is in reducing the in ‡ationary bias caused by time inconsistency. In this model time-consistency considerations are not relevant.
Ignoring endogenous selection, this would indeed make observed in ‡ation in countries with such institutions lower than in countries with political control over policy targets. Mapping the dichotomous in ‡ation policy variable = f0; 1g into in ‡ation rates b = f ; g ; > , expected in ‡ation under the two types of regime (ignoring endogeneity) is given as:
However, controlling for endogeneity makes the relationship between in ‡ation and CBI more complex. In particular, the relationship depends on what assumptions one makes about the distribution of p and across countries. Expected in ‡ation under political control remains the same. However, expected in ‡ation under CBI depends upon the average p under CBI, conditional on p being within the range under which CBI occurs endogenously, and where the range is determined by the value of :
2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
pf p (p) dp
Hence, the value of b CBI depends not on the entire distribution of p, but on the distribution given that independence is selected endogenously. The key portion of the distribution F p is that bounded by p; p, where these values themselves depend on . There is no automatic link between the unconditional expectation of p and its expected value within the critical range, and one can easily generate counterfactuals where
even if central bankers are conservative on average. 16 The intuition for this is that the simple argument for CBI-that it hands monetary policy to a group that tends to be in ‡ation-averse-ignores the fact that if the group is too likely to be in ‡ation-averse then delegation will be blocked by more in ‡ation-tolerant sections of society.
Endogenous selection has serious implications for existing studies of the e¤ect of CBI on in ‡ation. Because only "middle"ranges of p are consistent with endogenous goal 16 As an illustration, consider the following simple degenerate (cross-country) distribution for p: F (p) = f0:75 j p < 0:6; F (p) = 1 j p 0:6g. In this example, the unconditional expectation of in ‡ation under CBI (ignoring endogeneity) is b CBI = + 0:15 ( ) < b P OL ; whereas the conditional expectation under endogenous CBI, for = 0:5, is given as b CBI = + 0:6 ( ) > b P OL . In this example, Central Bankers tend on average to be in ‡ation-averse. However, where the Central Banker is too likely to be in ‡ation-averse (in ‡ation-tolerant with probability 0), CBI is blocked by the in ‡ation-tolerant group. The predicted relationship between in ‡ation and CBI will then be positive, even though, in a causal sense, delegation delivers control of policy to a group that is on average more in ‡ation-averse than the public. independence, the measured e¤ect of independence on in ‡ation may be biased towards zero even if the causal relationship is negative. Econometrically, the problem is one of endogeneity. Speci…cally, the decision to delegate is related to p, while the latter also a¤ects expected in ‡ation under the GICB, b CBI . Given that low draws of p are more likely than high draws if independent central bankers are conservative on average, then the average value of p in cases where goal independence is not chosen will be relatively low, with delegation generally associated with higher than average realizations of p. The endogeneity problem arises because the unmeasured parameter p enters the residuals for both the selection equation and the in ‡ation equation, causing the error terms to be positively correlated.
To capture central banker conservativeness, I assume that central bankers are low in ‡ation types with probability at least one-half (p 2 0; ). This implies that:
Then the coe¢ cient estimate measuring GICB's in ‡uence on in ‡ation will be biased. The true e¤ect, holding p constant, is ( ) 1 2 b p , while the e¤ect estimated by OLS, ignoring endogenous selection, is
p the measured e¤ect is biased toward zero. This could explain why the existing empirical literature on the issue has failed to identify a negative relationship between de jure measures of CBI and in ‡ation outside a narrow set of advanced economies (see Eij¢ nger and De Haan, 1996) .
In section IV I show that when one accounts for endogenous selection (via a treatment e¤ects, TE, model) there is indeed evidence that the error terms in the selection equation and the in ‡ation equation are positively correlated, supporting the endogenous selection argument and suggesting that the OLS estimate is indeed biased towards zero. Moreover, the TE estimate of the coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant. This supports the view that granting central banks independence reduces in ‡ation.
IV. Empirical Tests

A. Data Sources
Data on central bank independence is derived from Fry and others'(2000) rich dataset of central bank characteristics. 17 This dataset is particularly useful for our purposes as it di¤erentiates between goal and instrument independence. Central banks enjoying a goal independence rating of 100 percent are characterized as goal independent, those with ratings of less than 100 percent are characterized as not being goal independent.
18 Data on in ‡ation is taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Comparable (PPP) data on real GDP is obtained from the Penn World Tables v. 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002) . Data on countries'political system is taken from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2001 ).
Finally, I obtain information on in ‡ationary preferences from the World Values Survey second and third waves (observations covering 1990 and 1995-1998 respectively) .
19 This dataset contains individual-level survey information on respondents'views on a number of social and economic issues. Speci…cally, three questions ask respondents to highlight their …rst and second choices from a set of four alternative "aims"for their country. Each set includes one economic aim, one aim pertaining to authority and order, and two broader aims about the nature of society, touching on issues of rights, democracy and the environment amongst others. 20 One question has "…ghting rising prices"as the economic objective, while a second question asks respondents to rate "a high level of economic 17 Any classi…cation carries a degree of subjectivity. I compared the classi…cations in this dataset with (approximately) comparable internal IMF classi…cations for end-2003. Of the 32 countries in our dataset covered by these classi…cations, 12 were classi…ed di¤erently (all taking on a value of GICB = 0 in our dataset). Of these, 7 were countries whose central banks were subsequently subsumed by the ECB in 1999 (and took on the latter's goal independence rating in 2003) and were likely less independent prior to this (for instance, exchange rate parities within the Exchange Rate Mechanism were set by the Council of European Finance Ministers ECOFIN, with varying degrees of central bank participation). Of the …ve other countries, two appeared to have reformed their monetary policy frameworks between 1998 and 2003 to grant their central banks far greater independence, and hence seem to have been correctly designated in 1998. Three remaining countries therefore appear to have a questionable goal independence rating in our dataset. As a robustness check I adjusted the goal independence indicator from zero to one for these countries. The results remain substantially unaltered. 18 The original data allowed for a mid-point of 50 percent for countries where policy is decided by government and the central bank acting in tandem. Since a degree of direct political control is included in this environment, the 50 percent observations are treated as being non-independent for the purposes of assessing the model in this paper. In fact, few countries report a score of 0, so that the major variation is between countries with scores of 50 percent and 100 percent respectively (coded 0 and 1). 19 The Third Wave is closest in terms of date to the 1998 Central Bank institutional structure information.
However, including second wave observations for those countries for which second wave observations are available but third wave observations are not available increases the sample size from 26 to 36 countries. 20 The twelve aims, grouped by question and then category (economy, authority, society( 2)) are: (1): 'a high level of economic growth', '...strong defence forces', 'seeing that people have more say about how things are done...', 'making our cities and countryside more beautiful'; (2): '…ghting rising prices', 'maintaining order...', 'giving people more say in important government decisions', 'protecting freedom of speech'; and (3): 'a stable economy', '…ght against crime', '...a less impersonal and more humane society', '...a society where ideas count more than money'.
growth"over other policy objectives. Answers to these two questions are then used to generate a series of indices measuring the extent to which agents prefer lower in ‡ation. These indices are proxies for . I then use proxies for taken from the same dataset to generate (absolute) correlation coe¢ cients between the two. These are used as proxies for to test the main propositions of the paper.
Data are available for a total of 36 countries (constrained by the joint availability of institutional and preferences data). Table 1 gives the preferences ( ) and institutions (existence of GICB) data used in the empirical analysis. These two measures have the advantage of simplicity. However, they are vulnerable to two criticisms. First, they ignore the notion of a (short-term) trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and other economic objectives. Second, they ignore the role of the other alternatives in the survey question (which imply that agents'choice of "…ghting rising prices"as a major policy objective is a¤ected by how they rank other noneconomic policy objectives mentioned in the survey question).
B. Monetary Policy Preference Indices
The third method explicitly treats in ‡ation aversion as a trade-o¤ by combining the answers to the two key survey questions. A variable is generated for each of the two questions. Agents are allocated a score of 2 if the economic objective is rated as the most important objective, 1 if it is rated second, and zero if it is not rated in …rst or second place. If the agent does not respond to either the …rst or second preference question, the variable is coded as missing. De…ne S as the score for the question that has in ‡ation as a category and S g as the score for the growth question. Then overall relative in ‡ation aversion for agent i is given by:
2 f 1; :5; 0; :5; 1g (27) (2000); Preference correlation measure σ derived as absolute correlation between monetary policy preference measure (π) and second dimension measure (θ); Author's calculations using WVS data. Source: Fry and others (2000) ; World Values Survey (1990-91; 1995-97) .
The strengths of this measure are that it explicitly treats in ‡ation aversion as a trade-o¤ against economic growth, in keeping with the standard Phillips curve type argument, and also that it captures intensity by having a …ve-point scale rather than a simple binary measure. The weakness of the measure is that it does not eliminate the possible impact of preferences over the noneconomic policy objectives.
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The fourth measure attempts to deal with this last problem by screening out respondents whose preferences over in ‡ation versus economic growth are unclear. This measure is derived using a revealed preference methodology, and relies on making further assumptions on preferences over some of the alternative policy options in the two questions. The strength of this revealed preference measure is that it eliminates the e¤ect of other non-economic policy choices and provides a clear preference ordering between the two economic policy objectives. The weakness is that it relies on additional assumptions on agents'preferences which may not be valid.
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C. Proxies for Second Preference Dimension
I again use multiple proxies (two in this case). The …rst measure takes respondents'income (normalized as the estimated percentile of the income distribution) as the relevant characteristic. 23 The rationale for using income is that, over economic policy in particular, the primary divisions in society are likely to be along income lines. The second measure uses a closely aligned concept, of social class (self-assigned), to proxy for . This measure might be less accurate than the income measure since the de…nition of social class is more subjective.
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With four measures of in ‡ation aversion fb 1 ; :::; b 4 g and two second-dimension proxies n b 1 ; b 2 o , there are eight di¤erent measures of the absolute correlation between the two. All eight are then entered individually as possible explanatory variables in probit regressionscorresponding to in the theoretical model. 21 This measure is not a binary measure, as in the model, but can be thought of as mapping into the binary measure; intensity can be thought of as the certainty with which the measure maps into either = 1 or = 0. 22 The exact derivation of the index is detailed in Appendix II. 23 The derivation of the income percentiles is described in Appendix III. 24 I constructed more complex proxies for by combining data on income and/or social class with other indicators, such as survey responses to questions on reducing inequality, public ownership, and making social changes, through factor analysis. The derived results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those using the simple proxies. Table 2 tests the central proposition of this paper (Proposition 1). Eight di¤erent proxies for are used, corresponding to the four proxies for preferences over monetary policy fb 1 ; :::; b 4 g each interacted with the two proxies for the second preference dimension n b 1 ; b 2 o . The table's panels are organized with respect to the latter dimension, with each of both panels'four columns corresponding to the former dimension. Each column gives the results of a probit regression where goal independence f0; 1g is the dependent variable. The single control is the country's average autocracy score a (from the Polity IV dataset) for the 1990s. 25 Panel A shows that the four proxies derived from the income proxy b 1 perform relatively well. All are statistically signi…cant (three at the 5 percent level, one at the 10 percent level) and carry the predicted negative sign on the point estimate. Panel B shows that all the proxies derived from the social class measure b 2 are also statistically signi…cant in predicting goal independence (two at the 1 percent level, one at the 5 percent level, and one at the 10 percent level), and again all carry the negative sign predicted by the theory. Table 3 uses the regression results to predict GICB status (with a threshold for predicted GICB = f0; 1g at 0:5). Panels A and B present results for the full sample. It shows that the models tend to predict GICB = 0 (the dominant state) very well (with a success rate of around 85 to 90 percent), while their ability to predict GICB = 1 is less good (between 30 and 50 percent). In Panels C through F I analyze whether this result holds for all countries in the sample by dividing the sample into advanced and emerging market economies and tabulating the predicted and actual delegation decisions for each subgroup. Clearly, the predictive power of the model is far higher for advanced countries (Panels C and D, where the predictive power for GICB = 0 and GICB = 1 is up to 100 percent and 80 percent respectively) than for emerging market countries (Panels E and F).
D. Central Bank Independence and Preference Dispersal
26
E. In ‡ation Performance and Central Bank Independence Table 4 presents the results of regressing in ‡ation against a dummy for goal independence and a control (PPP GDP per capita, gdp). Column I presents results for the 78 countries for which data are available, while columns II and III present the same results for two subgroups, advanced and emerging market economies, respectively. The results con…rm the results of most other empirical investigations (see Eij¢ nger and de Haan, 1996) : there is a negative correlation between independence and in ‡ation for advanced countries but not for other countries or for the sample as a whole. 27 In the OLS model (column IV) CBI is found to have no e¤ect on in ‡ation (replicating the result from the broader sample presented in column I). However, when endogenous selection is introduced explicitly (columns V and VI) the estimated e¤ect of CBI is negative and quantitatively and statistically signi…cant. As predicted by the discussion in section III, the covariance between the error terms in the hazard equation and the second stage equation, , is positive, consistent with the OLS estimate of the coe¢ cient on GICB being biased upwards towards zero. This suggests that endogenous selection could be an important factor in explaining why many empirical studies have failed to …nd a robust relationship between CBI and in ‡ation, while also providing further support for this paper's account of endogenous selection.
V. Case Studies
So far the empirical results have abstracted from the mechanics of coalition formation and analyzed how the distribution of agents in the economy according to their preferences over monetary policy and other politically salient dimensions (income, social class) can dictate the decision to delegate. The "missing link"in this discussion is the coalition-formation stage of the game. I therefore brie ‡y outline some recent cross-country evidence and nineteenth-century U.S. evidence on coalition formation and monetary policy delegation that provides some anecdotal support for the view that delegation re ‡ects di¢ culties in forming coalitions. Bernhard and Leblang (2002) cite Bernhard (2000) to argue that the German Bundesbank's strong independent status helped the left-wing Social Democrats and the 27 In the treatment e¤ects model, the primary regression equation is given by:
A. Cross-Country Evidence
where z is a binary decision variable (in our case, GICB = f0; 1g) that stems from an unobservable latent variable:
where ; u are bivariate mean-zero normal with covariance matrix 1 . Maddala (1983, p. 122) provides an exposition of the model and associated likelihood function. Columns V and VI present results with w = [ ; a], using two di¤erent proxies for .
liberal market-oriented third party, the Free Democrats, to form a governing coalition in the 1970s, "despite their di¤erences on economic policy."Similarly, "strong monetary commitments in the Netherlands (a relatively independent central bank, a stable …xed exchange rate) may have facilitated an unlikely coalition between the Labor party (PvdA) and the Liberal party (VVD) in the 1990s by removing monetary policy as a potential source of con ‡ict." Bernhard (1998) argues that in the German case, because the right-wing Christian Democrats and likely coalition partner the Free Democrats shared "similar economic priorities,"the former had fewer incentives to maintain the Bundesbank's independence. As a result, "Christian Democratic governments have twice attempted to gain more authority over the Bundesbank"(in the 1950s and 1990s).
28 Bernhard (1998) The experience of South Africa is also instructive. Under the pre-1990 apartheid regime, when South Africa was ruled by a homogeneous elite whose economic policies directed resources and rents to its (ethnic) constituency, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was subordinate to the executive (Padayachee, 2001 ). However, the SARB was granted goal independence in the 1994 and 1996 constitutions under the auspices of South Africa's transition to democracy.
One could argue that CBI was a response by the elite to democratization, essentially a means of maintaining its monetary policy preferences into the democratic era. 30 On the other hand, it is instructive that the African National Congress (ANC) -led government 28 This illustrates a more general point: the existence of coalition governments is entirely consistent with less autonomous central banks. The key question is whether coalition partners di¤er on monetary policy issues (in which case autonomy will likely be preferred) or share similar platforms on this issue (in which case a less autonomous institutional arrangement is preferable). 29 This is re ‡ected in our data: the UK has the highest correlation in our sample between income or social class and monetary policy preferences, according to all but one of our measures for . 30 Boylan (1998) makes this argument in the case of Chile, noting that "the fact that the [pre-democracy] regime waited until it had been defeated in the plebiscite [on the restoration of democracy] in order to ratify the central bank reform lends plausibility to the argument that its timing was dictated by political reasons." The series of center-left coalition administrations that have governed Chile since 1990 have not reversed the reform. Boylan argues that this is because "they were powerless to do so" as a result of constitutional restrictions. On the other hand, our model could also be invoked in the Chilean case. The governing Concertación (coalition) included parties ranging from the center-right to the left, whose economic policy preferences were diverse. Particularly in the delicate early period following the restoration of democracy, there were presumably considerable bene…ts from maintaining a broad-based and stable coalition. Keeping the reform in place likely helped.
that took power in 1994 included a wide coalition of interests and monetary policy was a potential ‡ashpoint. Padayachee (2001) argues that internal disagreement over the SARB's status demonstrated "the tensions and struggle that existed within the ANC alliance over economic policy directions in the mid-1990s." Lodge (2004) concurs, arguing that "government economic policies have continued to engender contention between the ANC and its allies."South Africa's experience -a dependent central bank under a narrow and homogenous ruling coalition and an independent institution under a broad and potentially fractious coalition -therefore provides further anecdotal support for our model.
B. The United States in the Nineteenth Century
The Federal Reserve's current comparatively high degree of autonomy can be rationalized by the absence of a clear partisan split on monetary policy (Corder, 1998) . This contrasts with the nineteenth century. Opinion on banking and monetary matters was often split geographically, divided between the Northeast on the one hand and the South and West on the other. 31 This cleavage can be explained by the greater concentration of debtors (often farmers) in the South and West, who generally favored a more lax monetary policy to mitigate the e¤ects of frequent de ‡ations on the real value of debt (Timberlake, 1994, p. 108). 32 Assuming this regional split, we can analyze the extent to which the dominant political coalitions in the nineteenth century were divided along the same geographic fault line (implying a high value for , and predicting politically-motivated policymaking in our model) or drew their support from heterogenous groups (a low level of , predicting delegation). Coalitions are de…ned in terms of the dominant parties of the time (the Democrats versus the Whigs or Republicans). 33 As a proxy for , Figure 2 below plots the degree to which support for the executive was speci…c to its "home"region: assumed to be the North-East for Whigs and Republicans, and the South and West (i.e., states outside the Northeast) for the Democrats. The degree of regional speci…city is measured as the winning candidate's popular vote share in his home region (not necessarily the region including the candidate's own state) divided by his share in his non-home region. Bank of the United States in the 1790s (Timberlake, 1994, p. 7) , through Andrew Jackson's assault on the Second Bank of the United States in 1832 (Wilentz, 2005) , to debates over the return to the gold standard after the Civil War (Timberlake, 1994, p. 108) . 32 There was also a widely held perception that the banking system led to a drain of commodity money to the North-East from other parts of the country (Brands, 2005; p. 466) . 33 Jackson's opponents in 1828 and 1832 were National-Republicans. 34 Data from Leip (2006) . In three cases the executive's support is marginally stronger in its non-home region, but home-region support is generally much stronger, supporting our assignment of home region to the various parties. Figure 2 plots this measure from 1828 to 1912. Elections prior to 1824 were not particularly competitive, and the election of 1824 was e¤ectively won by Jackson but John Quincy Adams was awarded the presidency by a constitutional sleight of hand (Adams'support, incidentally, was highly region-speci…c: his vote share in the North-East was almost three times his share in other areas). The 1912 election was the last before the creation of the Federal Reserve. Elections during the anomolous period of the Civil War and Reconstruction are ignored.
Four episodes in the development of monetary institutions over the period illustrate how this changing distribution of preferences across coalitions in ‡uenced politicians'decisions to delegate. The …rst was Andrew Jackson's battle with the Second Bank of the United States (BUS). Jackson was elected in 1828 and reelected in 1832, his support highly skewed towards his rural Southern and Western powerbase. His 1832 decision to veto the charter renewal of the BUS-an autonomous institution whose operations were increasingly "resembling a modern central bank"-became the central issue in his reelection campaign. 35 As de Tocqueville noted in his Democracy in America, his antipathy to the BUS was a divisive issue, but acted to unite his coalition: "the educated classes ... line up behind the bank, while the people are for the President."
36 Jackson could take a strong line on the issue because his coalition held a uni…ed position. The second episode concerns attempts during subsequent decades to create a more arms-length institution to replace the network of "pet banks"created by Jackson. Monetary issues had become divisive within rather than between potential governing coalitions: Figure 2 shows that the presidents that followed Jackson drew di¤use regional 35 Wilentz (2005) , p. 394. 36 Brands (2005), p. 458. support, while Wilentz (2005, p. 664) comments that, by the 1850s, "many of the ancient economic and constitutional issues that long divided mainstream Democrats and Whigs had become virtually irrelevant."Politicians avoided taking a stand on the issue, seeking where possible to delegate responsibility (Timberlake, 1994, pp. 68-83) . Hence, the creation of the Independent Treasury in 1846 drew support from politicians of di¤erent parties, and while the institution was not de jure autonomous its passive approach to monetary policy combined with the link to gold meant that monetary policy was "o¤ the table."
The return to the gold standard after the in ‡ationary …nance of the Civil War and the subsequent agitation for, and rejection of, the monetization of silver in the 1880s and 1890s are also illustrative. The executive drew its support from a regionally diverse coalition during this period (Figure 2 ). Views on monetary policy, particularly the silver question, remained geographically polarized; however, up until 1892 the major parties had kept it "a sectional rather than a party issue."
37 The 1892 election, in which the silver issue featured prominently, delivered both the executive and the legislature to the Democrats. However, their presidential candidate attracted regionally diverse support, while the monetization of silver-seen as a means of implementing a more active monetary policy-was "a divisive issue between [president] Cleveland and the Democratic Congress."Hence, by the 1880s "the federal government had disengaged itself from discretionary control over the monetary system."Moreover, divisions between the di¤erent branches of the Democrat-controlled government also precluded a return to policy activism after 1892, despite pro-silver forces' strength in Congress.
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Elections from 1896 onwards witnessed a return to a more regionally-divided politics (Figure 2) , coinciding with greater monetary policy activism. Timberlake (1994; p. 249) argues that "by 1906 the Treasury was more a central bank in its deliberate attempts to in ‡uence the monetary system than the Second Bank had ever been." 39 The 1913 creation of the Federal Reserve system was in part Congress's reaction to the enhanced executive power that the Treasury's Central Banking role created. However, the new institution's governance structure retained a substantial degree of political control (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; pp. 190-5) . This can be rationalized in the context of the model by the relatively homogeneous governing coalition elected in 1912 (the victorious presidential candidate drew his support disproportionately from his "home"region, while his party simultaneously regained control of congress).
These four episodes therefore provide some evidence that the degree of autonomy the central bank-like institutions enjoyed during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries re ‡ected the extent to which dominant political coalitions at the time were divided either 37 Quotations relating to this episode taken from Timberlake (1994), pp. 164-182. 38 This episode also illustrates how divisions over monetary policy can lead to costly internal disputes. Agitation over silver during 1892-96 put monetary policy back on the table. Both sides commited substantial political resources to winning the debate: Cleveland agressively wielded the President's power of patronage to promote his anti-silver platform, while pro-silver senators in his own party resorted to the …llibuster to block him. This in…ghting led to the dramatic Republican victory in 1896. The GOP's success re ‡ected the fact that it "had successfully compromised the silver issue within itself" whereas "the Democrats engaged in an internecine con ‡ict that ruined their chances of political success for the next eighteen or twenty years." 39 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) come to a similar conclusion. between or within themselves over monetary policy. Monetary policy could be a contentious issue, and internal disagreement over policy had the potential to in ‡ict serious damage on a party. Hence divided parties were more keen to delegate policy, and united parties less so.
VI. Conclusions
This paper argues that policy delegation can cut the cost of coalition formation by reducing the dimensionality of political con ‡ict. The model delivers an empirically testable proposition, that delegation is more likely when the correlation of agents'preferences across di¤erent policy dimensions is lower. The model has implications for the extensive empirical literature on central bank independence. It illustrates how endogenous selection could account for the relatively limited estimated e¤ect of CBI on in ‡ation performance. In fact, once one controls for endogenous selection, the evidence that CBI reduces in ‡ation is signi…cantly stronger.
The model, applied here to monetary policy, is su¢ ciently general that it could be used to analyze other questions, such as the delegation of responsibility over trade policy (e.g., in a customs union) or the division of …scal responsibilities between di¤erent tiers of government. On the other hand, the model relies on quite restrictive assumptions (e.g., dichotomous policies, two policy dimensions) for tractability. Further work should focus on testing its predictions in other policy settings, and generalizing its results to less restrictive modeling environments.
Appendix I. Equilibrium Coalition Structure
I adopt the sequential coalition formation game formulated by Bloch (1996) . This game is suited to our purposes because it assumes a given mapping of coalition structure into payo¤s (as in our situation). 40 The game has four players, consisting of a representative member of each of the four factions. As in Bloch, the game is de…ned over a valuation v that maps the set of coalition structures into (four-element) payo¤ vectors and a rule of order that de…nes the order in which the four players move. 41 The game is structured as follows: the …rst player (according to ) proposes the formulation of a coalition to which he belongs. Every other prospective member of this coalition then responds to this o¤er, in the order de…ned by (in our case, each coalition has at most one other member, apart from the player proposing the coalition). If one of these members rejects the proposed coalition, then he makes a counter-o¤er (to which all prospective members of this proposed coalition must now respond, again in order according to ). Otherwise, if all members of the proposed coalition agree, then this coalition forms and its members withdraw from the game (they are now committed to membership of this coalition). The game then carries on (with coalition o¤ers etc.) among the remaining players according to . 42 The game ends when all players have exited.
The payo¤ matrix below gives the payo¤s from di¤erent coalition structures (recall that each player can be a member of a , or 0 coalition). Since the game is totally symmetric, only one set of payo¤s is shown. Payo¤s may di¤er for the larger and smaller factions J 2 fS; Lg.
40 Ray and Vohra (1999) propose a similar game, but in their game the intra-coalition allocation is endogenous. For our purposes, this represents an unnecessary additional complication. 41 The valuation is de…ned by the intra-coalition bidding process discussed in the text, which results in payo¤ vectors for each coalition structure. Hence payo¤s are endogenous for the game as a whole, but exogenous to the coalition-formation subgame. 42 Bloch (1996) provides a formal discussion of the game's structure. and the payo¤s have been normalized: V V > 1; V 1. The variable gives the probability of the disputed policy matching the preferred policy of the larger faction within the victorious two-faction coalition. From equation (9), its value is:
I adopt Bloch's equilibrium concept of stationary perfect equilibrium: a subgame perfect equilibrium that is also stationary. The de…ning feature of stationarity is that only payo¤-relevant variables (any existing coalition o¤er, the players who have exited the game and the coalition structure (partition) of this set of exited players) a¤ect strategies.
Proposition A.1 This game has only one coalition structure that is consistent with stationary perfect equilibrium: ; (two opposing coalitions form along the most contentious policy dimension ).
Proof. By backwards induction. I …rst derive equilibrium strategies for the subgames when two players (factions) have formed either one or two coalitions and left the game. I show that if a coalition has already formed, then only the coalition structure ; can emerge in equilibrium. I then derive equilibrium strategies for the subgames where no coalitions have already formed, and show that the …rst coalition to exit must be a coalition. This completes the proof.
Assume that at least one coalition has formed and its members have exited the game, and that a total of two players have exited (two remain). There are then three potential partitions of the players who have exited the game:
(that is, two "0 coalitions,"a " coalition"or a " coalition").
The optimal response of an agent o¤ered membership of a coalition in either of the two feasible subgames would be to accept the o¤er.
43 This is because: For the same reason, in the subgame where two players have exited and formed either or [0; 0], then if an o¤er of is feasible, making the o¤er (which will be accepted) is optimal.
Hence, if a coalition has formed, then ; is the only stationary perfect equilibrium coalition structure. Assuming that the o¤er will be accepted, the optimality conditions for making the o¤er are the same as for accepting the o¤er. But the players (factions) making and receiving the o¤er will by de…nition be di¤erent sizes. Hence, the optimality conditions need to hold for both types of faction fS; Lg for the o¤er to form the coalition to be both o¤ered and accepted. This implies that the coalition cannot form when the coalitions Now consider the subgame where a single player has formed a [0] coalition and withdrawn unilaterally from the game. Consider a player receiving a (feasible) o¤er of a coalition in this subgame. Accepting this o¤er is optimal because the payo¤ C J received in the resulting coalition structure is higher than the payo¤ in any other coalition structure. Since the o¤er will be accepted, making the o¤er is optimal for the same reason. Finally, if such an o¤er is feasible, no player in a position to make or receive the o¤er will accept any other o¤er, because the coalition delivers the best payo¤ and because, by the ordering , the player will later have the opportunity to either make or accept the o¤er of .
This implies that, when a single player has exited from the game, the only feasible coalition structure is 0; 0; . But in this case, the player that exits the game obtains the payo¤ B J which is his lowest possible payo¤. Hence, withdrawing from the game cannot be an optimal strategy when no coalitions have already formed. This leaves making the o¤er or [ ] as potential …rst moves in equilibrium. Hence, we consider the best response to these moves (assuming that no coalitions have already formed).
First, assume that a player receives an o¤er of a coalition. If the player accepts the o¤er then the coalition forms. We know that in this case, the other coalition will also form, giving all players the payo¤ A. Now assume that the player receives an o¤er of a [ ] coalition. If he accepts the o¤er, and the coalition forms, we know that the other [ ] coalition forms i¤ 1 V > . In this case, all players receive A. If the player accepts and 1 V then the coalition structure will instead be [0; 0; ] from which the player obtains C J .
What if the player rejects whatever o¤er he has received? The player's expected payo¤ now depends on what coalition structure the player expects to subsequently emerge. These expectations must be consistent with equilibrium behavior (i.e., a player cannot attach a positive probability to a coalition structure inconsistent with equilibrium behavior). We have already shown that no player will play [0] …rst, so that the …rst coalition to subsequently form must be either [ ] or
. The player will either be a member of this …rst coalition or not be a member. Hence, there are four potential …rst coalition formation scenarios depending on which coalition forms and whether the player is a member. Assume that the player attaches probabilities p i , i = f1; 2; 3; 4g to these scenarios, where Clearly, in the …rst case, since A (p 1 + p 3 ) A + (p 2 + p 4 ) A A, the player will always accept an o¤er of a coalition and never accept the o¤er of a [ ] coalition. Since the o¤er of is always accepted it is always optimal to make such an o¤er. Hence, for 1 V > , the only coalition structure consistent with stationary perfect equilibrium is ; .
In the second case, note that for any small faction:
Hence a small faction will never accept an o¤er of o¤er is rejected. Note that since A > C S and B S > C S , the player can only propose the [ ] coalition if he believes that it will be rejected (otherwise proposing the coalition strictly dominates). For his beliefs to be rational, then it must be the case that such an o¤er will be rejected by the other player (the large faction). Hence, if a large faction proposes a [ ] coalition, it is always rejected by the small faction, and if a small faction proposes a [ ] coalition, it must always rejected by the large faction for the o¤er to be (rationally) made. This implies that a [ ] coalition can never be o¤ered and accepted, and therefore cannot form in equilibrium. Hence, for 1 V , the only coalition structure consistent with stationary perfect equilibrium is also ; . This completes the proof.
Appendix II. The Revealed Preference Proxy b 4
To allow the response to the two separate questions to yield a full preference ordering, I match two pairs of alternatives in the questions, assuming that agents are indi¤erent between the two policies within each pair. The policies are matched as follows: The rationale for this matching is that the second pair of policies both refer to law and order and the third pair both refer to democracy, and one would expect policy preferences over the two policies in each pair to be very similar. Preference orderings are denoted by the notation A B : "Policy A strictly preferred to Policy B;"A B : "Agent is indi¤erent between policies A and B."Then the matching is equivalent to the assumptions:
Within each question k, a preference ordering can be uncovered by ranking policy alternatives according to …rst choice (P 1 k ), second choice (P 2 k ) and unchosen policies P U 1
Our assumptions P 12 P 22 , P 13 P 23 then allow us to uncover preference orderings across questions, speci…cally with reference to the economic policy options P 11 ; P 21 . For instance:
Agents can then be assigned a (binary) score for b 44 The lack of a transitive preference ordering can arise in a number of cases, for instance if P 21 [P 22 P 12 ] P 11 but P 11 [P 13 P 23 ] P 21 .
